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ABSTRACT

In the current environment of military operations requesting faster delivery
schedules to counter insurgent tactics, the engineering team often searches for how to
quickly deliver the “80% solution”, typically in 6-12 months. These are labeled rapid
development projects. A content analysis of best practices in commercial product
development literature, where time to market is often a driving factor, was accomplished
showing varying emphasis of systems engineering technical and technical management
processes. Technical Planning, Stakeholders Requirements Development, and Architecture
Design were identified as important processes. This analysis confirms preconceived notions
of “plan upfront and early” by emphasizing the SE processes of Stakeholder Requirements
Definition, Architecture Design and Technical Planning. A purposive sampling of AFRL
rapid development program managers and engineers was conducted to identify important
SE processes and compared to the literature content analysis. The results of this sampling
did not strongly emphasize one process over another however Architecture Design,
Implementation scored higher among Technical Processes. Decision Analysis, Technical
Planning, Technical Assessment and Data Management scored slightly higher among
Technical Management Processes. Anecdotal evidence also emphasized iterating prototype
designs based on early customer feedback, focusing mostly on critical risks and holding
more reviews early in a project schedule until a trust in the team is built.
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RAPID DEVELOPMENT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS COMPARISON OF
LITERATURE AND PURPOSIVE SAMPLING OF AFRL RAPID REACTION
PROJECTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The accelerated pace of change in the tactics, techniques and procedures used by adversaries of the
United States has heightened the need for a rapid response to new threats. Fielding systems in response to urgent
operational needs over the last half decade has revealed the DoD lacks the ability to rapidly field new capabilities
for the warfighter in a systematic and effective way. – Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs, July 2009

Background
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system is chartered with providing
effective, affordable, and timely systems to our operational forces (DoD 5000.01). From
Los Angeles-class submarines to the M1A1 Abrams tank to the F-22 Raptor, the DoD has
produced the most technologically advanced weapon systems ever made. With a workforce
of 130,000 (OSD/AT&L, 2010), the acquisition community delivers the tools enabling our
military to perform the missions they are tasked to accomplish.
The process by which we develop those warfighting tools has continually evolved
to meet the changing times. A RAND study of acquisition reform (Hanks et al, 2005) lists
major events in acquisition reform as shown in Table 1, to which this author has modified
for brevity and included recent revisions to the DoD 5000 series of instruction that guides
the execution of programs.
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Table 1. Acquisition Reform Milestones
Date
1972
1974
1982
1983
1983
1984
1985
1986
1986
1990
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
2001
2007
2008
2009

Major Acquisition Event
Commission on Government Procurement
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Executive Order 12352 (established the FAR and directed procurement reforms)
Grace Commission
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Department of Defense Procurement Reform Act
Department of Defense Reorganization Act (“Goldwater-Nichols Act”)
Packard Commission
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
Acquisition Law Advisory Panel
Government Performance and Results Act
Secretary of Defense Perry‟s “Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change”
DUSD for Acquisition Reform Office first established
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
Commission on Defense Roles and Missions (CORM)
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
Clinger-Cohen Act
Defense Reform Act
Quadrennial Defense Review #1, issued May 1997 (called for by FY95 NDAA)
Acquisition Results Act
DoD 5000 rewrite
DoD 5000.01 Revised
DoD 5000.02 Revised
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)
Currently, the United States is challenged in responding to new emerging threats,

specifically in the proliferation of the improvised explosive device (IED). To complicate
this threat, the enemy uses readily available commercial items and various explosive
materials to build IEDs, combat tests hundreds of combinations of these devices aided by
blending into the local population and by the covert nature of the devices, and
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communicates lessons learned and success stories across shadow websites on the Internet
(JIEDDO, 2009).
The impact of our enemies‟ ability to produce weapon systems quicker, cheaper
and within reach of our forces has lead to numerous studies on how to rapidly field new
capabilities to the warfighter (DSB 2007, 2009; GAO 2010; Solomon, 2008). Anecdotal
reviews of prior wartime acquisition offer the insight that it is possible to respond to
emerging threats in a responsive manner to give our warfighters the advantage. Radar
stations developed before and during WWII provided the British and Americans early
warning for incoming German bombers (Brown, 1999). The Culin Hedgerow Cutter was
adapted from steel obstacles (originally emplaced by the German army) and attached to the
front of Sherman tanks allowing the breaching of hedgerows to counter German
emplacements in confined fields in the taking of the French town of St. Lo (Guttman,
1998). Electronic countermeasures were implemented in F-100, F-105 and F-4 Wild
Weasel squadrons to locate and negate surface-to-air (SAM) site threats during Vietnam
(Hewitt, 1992). The United States military has a history of quickly implemented responses
to emerging threats.
In fact, there are current efforts to provide our warfighters with timely solutions to
their needs. The Defense Science Board identified no less than 20 groups dedicated to such
a task (DSB, 2009). These organizations were found at many levels from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) in the services to the
Combatant Commands (COCOMs) themselves. Some were focused on a specific threat or
capability, like the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) or the Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
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Task Forces, while others sought a way to handle the broader rapid fielding process, like
the Rapid Reaction Technology Office or the Army Rapid Equipping Force.
Within the Air Force, the future technology capabilities are discovered, developed
and delivered in the Air Force Research Laboratory. AFRL has aligned its programs along
three Core Processes, each focused on the different stages from science studies to
technology insertion. Core Process 3 (CP3) addresses the immediate needs requested by the
warfighter and delivers a demonstration prototype within “12 months or less” (AFRL
Instruction 90-104, Vol 3). While not fully matured along standard acquisition
requirements, the prototype is expected to be used in the field upon completion of a
successful demonstration. During the development effort, transition partners identify paths
to insert the capability into programs of record, if desired.
Recently, AFRL issued an instruction for executing the CP3 mission. AFRLI 90104, Vol 3, lays out general organization strategies such as forming “rapid reaction teams”
and iNodes by matrixing subject matter experts from across AFRL, industry and academia
to solve urgent needs. General guidance to meet timelines and frequent process owner
updates combined with organizational “hard chargers” ensure prototypes are delivered on
time. Currently there is no collection of lessons learned or best practices that would assist a
program manager in creating a development strategy on short timeframes.
Previous studies have investigated 1) how DoD rapid development/ rapid
acquisition organizations use innovation to meet urgent needs (Behm et al, 2009) and 2)
how AFRL implements a systems engineering approach across all its programs to
effectively deliver products to the acquisition community (Solomon, 2008). This effort will
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synthesize the two ideas to identify the systems engineering practices necessary for
successful rapid development efforts within AFRL.
Problem Statement and Objective
Complex weapon systems require a level of organization to communicate designs,
establish milestones and lay out a schedule. The field of systems engineering has developed
a framework with a track record of helping programs stay on cost and on time (Honour,
2004). However, systems engineering (SE) is perceived in the science and technology
(S&T) culture of AFRL as non-value added (Behm et al, 2009; Doyle, 2008). However, if a
traditional SE approach can be tailored and validated for rapid development projects, this
would be an approach well suited to meet user expectations by delivering quality products
along aggressive schedules. The objective is to develop such a framework through
literature review and validate by studying recent rapid development efforts in AFRL.
Research questions
1. What accepted activities in rapid development literature and practice correlate to
Defense Acquisition SE activities?
2. What SE activities were emphasized by AFRL program managers, lead engineers
and key personnel on recent rapid development projects?
3. How does the model reflecting the literature compare to the model found in AFRL
rapid development projects?
Methodology
A review of literature will identify industry best practices for rapid development
and systems engineering. Out of this review, a framework of key practices for rapid
development will be derived from a comparison of current DoD suggested practices for
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systems engineering. A purposive sampling of AFRL rapid reaction team members will
identify key SE activities utilized in recent projects and will be compared to the model
formed by the literature study. Finally, a recommendation of best practices will be crafted
for future AFRL CP3 projects conveyed in draft language for updates to the current AFRL
Instruction 90-104, Volume 3, “AFRL Core Process 3, Innovative Solutions to Near-Term
Needs”.
Summary
This chapter identified the need for rapid development and current challenges faced
by the DoD. AFRL has instituted Core Process 3 to handle rapid development projects to
meet urgent needs of the warfighter. Instituting best practices of successful rapid
development projects within AFRL identified by literature review and validated with case
studies will increase the success of CP3 projects. Chapter 2 will provide a literature review
of the DoD‟s acquisition system, its efforts to meet urgent warfighter needs, and best
practices of rapid development approaches in the academic and business literature. Chapter
3 will provide the methodology to determine a tailored systems engineering approach for
CP3 projects within AFRL. Chapter 4 will compare the proposed framework with the case
studies and present the results and assess the importance of SE activities in those case
studies. Chapter 5 will then evaluate the framework and identify any possible
improvements and conclude with a tailored SE model for rapid development projects
conducted under AFRL‟s Core Process 3.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Current DoD Acquisition and Rapid Reaction Efforts
Formal Department of Defense acquisition processes and organizations have been
slow and unresponsive to initial requests to counter the IED threat (DSB, 2009). The
acquisition model currently used by the Department of Defense is based on three highly
interrelated and complex processes to deliver weapon systems to our armed forces as
outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook- see Figure 1. The Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process identifies gaps in current warfighter
capabilities and proposes solutions to fill those gaps. The Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process makes the monetary and programmatic
investments based on the prioritized list of gaps and solutions determined by the JCIDS
process. The Defense Acquisition System executes programs based on the funding they
receive to deliver a product to the warfighter.
The funding generally operates on a two year cycle and justification to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is generally required to make any major changes to the plan. The gaps
discovered by the JCIDS process are initiated by requirements from the operational user
who perceives a shortfall in capability of the equipment developed and procured for them.
During wartime, solutions are needed much quicker than starting in the next two-year
cycle. In response, many ad hoc organizations have sprung up and established
organizations have developed new processes to meet the thousands of requirements, Joint
and Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs and UONs) as defined in CJCS Instruction
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3470.01, coming from combatant commanders. Figure 2 displays some of these
organizations.

Figure 1: DoD Decision Support System (DAG, Ch1)
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense has established the Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to be the focal point for responding to JUONs. To manage
COCOM requests that need a timely response, the DoD has created a subset of JUONs
called Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs). These requests are designated by the JRAC as
needing a material or logistic solution within 120 days. The JRAC then works with the
appropriate service or organization to find a solution within 120 days, which if approved is
delivered to the COCOM.
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Figure 2: DoD Rapid Reaction Organizations (DSB, Urgent Needs, 2009)
The Air Force has established its own Rapid Response Process as codified in AFI
63-114. While oriented towards Air Force UONs, it has the capability to respond to JUONs
if the solution resides within the Air Force Space and Missile System Center (AFSPC), the
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) or the
Program Executive Officers. The process starts with a COCOM submitting a UON to the
lead MAJCOM (ACC, AMC, AFSOC, or AFSPC) which has the mission or capability
shortfall addressed by the UON. A Combat Capability Document (CDD) may then be
delivered to Headquarters Air Force for approval. This initiates the Rapid Response
Process (RRP) which then reviews the CCD based on a set of criteria that includes
timeliness of the solution, need of the capability to address the shortfall, whether the
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capability is “operationally safe, suitable and effective, supportive, sustainable, affordable
with the support infrastructure already in place,” do not require RDT&E to field and that
the CCD has addressed Mishap Prevention per AFI 91-202. If the CCD is approved
without issues, HQAF is notified and the solution is implemented. If the CCD does not
meet the RRP criteria, the lead MAJCOM may submit their request through the JCIDS
process.
This emphasis on potentially lengthy upfront analysis and preparation has created a
deterrent to pursue the RRP and incentive to find other means of answering the J/UONs. As
described in CJCSI 3470.01 which addresses how JUONs are validated and funded,
In most cases, the lead MAJCOM satisfies the combatant
commander‟s urgent need through means other than the CCD process
(non-materiel solution, internal programming authority, off-the-shelf
purchase, etc.). This is the preferred method as it provides the quickest
support to the warfighter.
In addition to the above instruction, recent discussions with HQ AFMC staff members
validated the above statement by noting that no CCD has been written in the past year for
submittal to the RRP.
It has been the personal experience of this author that in addition to the formal topdown flow of urgent needs, J/UONs are also created in a grassroots fashion. J/UONs are
sometimes the product of warfighters connecting directly with product centers and
technology experts. Once the need is expressed and a solution found, the J/UON is drafted
and submitted through the formal channels and the solution is presented to the decision
makers as an option. While not officially endorsed, it does have the benefit on reducing the
time in discovering a solution.
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AFRL has recently formalized a process to respond directly to urgent warfighter
needs. To understand it in context an overview of AFRL is warranted. The official mission
of AFRL is to discover, develop and deliver technology for insertion into the fighting force.
It accomplishes this mission by three Core Processes. Core Process 1 (CP1) focuses on
discovery and invests in basic research that the Air Force has determined will be needed to
maintain superiority. Core Process 2 (CP2) matures and demonstrates applied research
technologies that show potential for insertion into the inventory. Core Process 3 (CP3) has
been established to meet urgent needs by providing direct communication between a Major
Command (MAJCOM) or Combatant Command (COCOM) and the Lab to develop and
demonstrate a solution within one year.

Figure 3: AFRL Core Processes (AFRL Overview, Lab 101)
A Core Process 3 project is loosely defined as capability that is intended to be
fielded within two years. The project can either be initiated in two ways. “Technology
push” efforts are considered by the AFRL Corporate Board and funded based on the
perceived benefits of the proposed solution. “Requirements pull” projects allow a
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MAJCOM or COCOM to directly request AFRL funding of solutions to urgent needs.
Figure 4 illustrates that process.

Figure 4: CP3 Requirements Pull Flowchart (CP3 Innovation and Collaboration, Lab 101)
Once the user has identified the need the request is communicated by the
MAJCOM leadership (usually the first general officer in the user‟s chain). The request is
sent to the AFRL commander for review and tags the request as a CP3 project. A 1-3
month study will define the problem as defined by the user, identify potential solutions and
defines the timeline, cost and manning required to meet the request. The project is then
reviewed by the AFRL commander and if approved, executed according to the proposal. A
demonstration of the capability is set for 7-12 months from the initial request and, if it
meets the user‟s requirements, is fielded. During this year, transition leads and paths are
identified if the project warrants inclusion into a program of record (POR).
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Currently there is no guidance on how to manage a CP3 program any differently
from any other project in the Lab. Program managers are usually chosen due to excelling
performance on previous projects and are typically “hard chargers” found in most
organizations. Projects usually take on the personality of the program manager, or PM.
While a “get it done” attitude helps in completing the paperwork necessary to start and run
a project, there may be “blind spots” that PMs are missing that lead to inefficiencies,
rework or not meeting schedules that are, by nature of the organization, aggressive. This
study seeks to discover any blind spots and provide recommendations to support the
program manager.
Prior Studies of Defense Rapid Development
A recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on Fulfilling Urgent Operational
Needs cited eight studies in the past five years that propose changes that would create an
agile, responsive process for the DoD to rapidly field solutions to urgent needs. The
common theme was that the current acquisition model does not satisfy the timeline of
developing solutions to urgent needs because it focuses on “micromanaging risk and
achieving the 100 percent solution” (DSB, 2009). While it might be tempting to use this as
justification to abandon systems engineering principles to reduce timelines and “get it
faster”, this impulse should be resisted. The fact is technical solutions are required to be
engineered to fit within the larger military toolkit. Solutions must not work only in a
vacuum.
The DSB also published a study establishing the Strategic Technology Vectors
(DSB, 2007). A recommendation is made for a single Rapid Fielding Office to coordinate
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all rapid reaction organizations. This call is later echoed by the DSB Task Force on
Fulfilling Urgent Needs with the proposal of the Rapid Acquisition Fielding Agency (DSB,
2009). One key recommendation in both reports is the use of systems engineering as a
“cross-cutting enabler” that “manages the tradeoffs necessary to develop and field a system
that is affordable, is sustainable, is delivered on schedule, satisfies user needs, and
minimizes risk.” (DSB, 2007)
The search, then, is to find the proper balance of SE practices implemented in a
rapid reaction project. Two recent studies have independently addressed a tailored SE
approach for AFRL and rapid development and acquisition. The 2009 AFIT thesis, “A
Tailored Systems Engineering Framework for Science and Technology Projects,”
addressed a perceived disconnect between the conceptual framework of SE and its actual
implementation in research projects. It produced a SE tool based on six discriminates:
budget category, budget size, core process, technology readiness level, level of integration,
and requirements maturity (i.e. requirements push or tech pull). The output of the tool when
applied to a particular project was a level of “SE rigor” which placed each technical and
technical management process into one of the following categories: Required,
Recommended, Watch List, Not Applicable. It follows that this tool could be applied to
rapid reaction projects.
In the 2008 AFIT thesis, “An Analysis of Methodologies and Best Practices for
Rapidly Acquiring Technologies to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs”, Capt David Solomon
studied the ways in which rapid reaction organizations foster innovation and how they
utilize the “critical enablers” identified in the DSB Strategic Technology Vector study. As
one of the enablers, systems engineering‟s perceived value varied across DoD rapid
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reaction organizations. Some respondents viewed it as vital while others saw no value.
Nevertheless, one recommendation for future study was to investigate the appropriate
amount of systems engineering and determine a tailored approach for projects that answer
an urgent need.
Rapid Development Outside the Defense Department
Rapid development outside the military encompasses a few different areas. The
field of prototyping deals with manufacturing a test product quickly. While the goal of this
study is to shorten the time to deliver products, rapid prototyping focuses on the specific
assembly of the product based on a complete design. Therefore the scope of this inquiry
will extend beyond rapid prototyping. The field of software development also offers many
methods to deliver products quickly. The attributes of software development lend to short
time cycles from product design and integration to test and typically go through numerous
iterations before a final product is delivered. While many of the urgent needs of the military
tend towards hardware solutions, the lesson of understanding a problem and developing a
solution is common to both cases. Finally, there exist studies in business management
literature on how to shorten the cycle of product development. While the focus of these
studies is to be first to market and being responsive to shifting consumer trends in order to
maximize profitability, the methods uncovered will also be applicable since the goal of a
short product cycle is common to both. Also, being first to market in the military sense
equates to an advantage in technology or tactics for which the enemy hasn‟t developed
countermeasures.
In 1991, James Martin wrote Rapid Application Development which sought to
provide an alternative to “rigid” development methods, such as the waterfall method, to the
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software development community (Howard, 2002). In 1995, a group of software
developers in the UK teamed with end-user organizations to create the Rapid Application
Development (RAD) standard (Millington and Stapleton, 1995). The goal of the standard
was to be a framework for vendors to follow when writing software applications. They
listed five phases in the development life cycle. The first two focused on business matters,
namely a feasibility report and a business study. The third phase focused on “functional
model iteration, producing a functional prototype, a statement of non-functional
requirements and an implementation strategy”. Following this was a “design-and-build
iteration” where the prototype was tested against requirements. The authors suggest three
iterations between the third and forth phases “for initial investigation, refinement, and
consolidation.” Finally the system is implemented with the users with manuals and
training.
While touted as a standard, RAD was more of a philosophy requiring autonomy
and senior leader buy-in, experience and recognized talent among a stable team. In 2000, a
case study was used to showcase RAD methods in an internal BT (formerly British
Telecom) intranet project (Beynon-Davies, et al, 2000). In it, a matrixed team of employees
was separated from their duty stations and tasked with building an internal on-line resource
for their corporate relations department. In it the team delivers a working prototype in three
weeks. While not being the final answer, the product allowed for future enhancement based
on the potential of added requirements and was a complete product in that it met the
requirements within the scope of the project.
A group at BAE Systems, Advanced Technology Centre, took RAD one step
further in aggregating Extreme Programming (one of the different flavors of agile software
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development including RAD) and systems engineering (Jones and Leung, 2005). The
objective was to build a wide area surveillance system that could be commercialized
despite technical complexity. Their approach to the problem followed a three-point plan: 1)
Define the CONOP to give a high level view of the system and provide scenarios for
development and test. 2) Determine key questions in understanding the requirements. And
3) Develop a prototype system based on technologically mature components. The case
study documents the development of a prototype system that through iterations from an
initial system, meets the performance parameters established at the beginning of the
project. Key, in the authors‟ minds, was the understanding of the component technology
and the requirements of the system, both individual performance requirements and an
understanding of the scenarios in which it was to perform.
In the world of business literature, a series of books written in the 1990s set the
stage for companies to think about how they develop new products. In 1992, Wheelwright
and Clark present “concepts for the effective organization and management of product and
process development” in their book, Revolutionizing Product Development. Using case
studies of Kodak, GE, Motorola and Lockheed they looked at project management
frameworks in each company and identify five commonalities, namely “customer focus,
discipline, coherence, fit and sharing the pattern.” Customer focus sought to understand the
user‟s requirements but also their unmet needs. A contemporary case in the consumer
electronics market would be Apple‟s success with the iPod. In the military sense, this can
be seen as understanding the capability gap beyond what the user states as requirements.
“What aspect of their mission is not being met that they don‟t know yet?” Discipline is
geared towards a streamlined process that fosters “thoroughness and consistency” but
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doesn‟t “stifle creativity” or slow down projects with unnecessary oversight. Coherence
deals with assigning the right skills to projects not only in a technical sense but also a
managerial approach. Fit with the mission ensures that the solutions of a project match the
stated objectives; for example, technical solutions to solve technical problems rather than
manufacturing or personnel issues. Finally, sharing the pattern looks at how organizations
communicate a common framework and set expectations of “what must be done, when and
how.”
Focusing on the “discipline” aspect, Wheelwright and Clark devote Chapter 9 to
“Tools and Methods” for executing projects. After proposing strategies for meeting
performance goals and laying out effective plans, making sure the right people understand
the right processes, the authors focus in on problem solving at the working level. Crossfunctional teams meeting with each other to “solve specific problems.” In their study, the
ability to solve problems was at the heart of good product development. Their method for
consistent, quality problem solving is broken down into the “design-build-test cycle”.
Similar to the Vee Model in the Systems Engineering Handbook (INCOSE, 2003),
Wheelwright and Clark‟s model is straightforward. In the design phase, requirements and
tradeoffs are explored with clear objectives and alternative solutions are generated. The
build phase then acts on those designs whether producing CAD models or test code or other
engineering prototypes. The test phase then executes a test plan based on collecting the
right information accurately in an environment as close as possible to the intended use
environment. Wheelwright and Clark also encourage the use of iterations if the first cycle
fails to meet the expected performance measures.
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In 1993, in the second edition of his book, Winning at New Products: Accelerating
the Process from Idea to Launch, Robert Cooper proposed Stage-Gates as a method to
develop new products. Similar to the Defense acquisition milestones, Stage-Gates take an
idea through a series of gates to determine if the idea is worth committing resources to go
to the next stage. The five stages, being Preliminary Design, Business Case, Development,
Testing and Validation, Full Product & Market Launch, all have entrance and exit criteria
and allow a team to focus on each phase before proceeding to the next. One caution from
the author is that it is intended that the process not focus on one functional area per stage,
but rather use multi-functional teams to work in parallel through the stages. For instance, a
test team member might have valuable insight on creating a testable specification during
the preliminary design phase that will shorten test time down the road or a marketing team
member may use validation results that would target key early adopters in winning early
critiques of the product. Stage-Gates are not intended to be inflexible and companies are
encouraged to tailor them to suit different project category needs. The process should
enable teams to create the right product efficiently, not enable management to become
roadblocks.
For the purposes of this research, the reader should assume that the project idea has
been identified, the business case has been pitched and management has agreed to initiate
the project. This starts the project in Stage 3, Development. The first action Cooper
suggests is to confirm the requirements. Bring users in to expose any incorrect assumptions
or to re-prioritize the performance targets in case there were shifts in the marketplace
(analogous to threats and capability gaps in the military). A development plan is then built
with tasks listed, realistic timelines to complete and resources assigned. Additionally,

19

milestones throughout the project with definable goals for the development set targets that
team members can agree on and plan activities accordingly. Throughout the development
stage, in-house testing is iterative and customer involvement and feedback is essential in
creating the right product. Cooper‟s Stage 4 encompasses preference tests (“do I like your
product better than what I have”) and field trials (limited quantities or simulations to gauge
user interest) are analogous to the DoD‟s operational testing. In each case, the product is
tested in a relevant environment with representative users to validate the product and
collect feedback before full-rate production.
Five years later in 1998, the second edition of Preston Smith and Donald
Reinersten‟s book, Developing Products in Half the Time: New Rules, New Tools was
published. Smith and Reinertsen pick up on the ideas of the two prior authors and offer a
few of new concepts such as the “fuzzy front end” which they define as the time from when
an opportunity is discovered to when a development team begins work on the project.
Some of this time is due to the bureaucratic nature of organizations but also includes
factors such as expedited shipping costs that may be reduced if identified earlier in the
project timeline. As an improvement to Cooper‟s Stage-Gate style of phased project
planning, Smith and Reinertsen suggest product development organizations reduce the
emphasis on the gates (i.e. less formal reviews) and more emphasis on the flow of the
project. For example, management may decide exit criteria for each stage and let the team
decide when they have met those criteria. Reports could be presented at quarterly reviews
(or more frequent) to ensure projects don‟t run amok.
In separate sections, Smith and Reinertsen address managing risk. In the first,
technical risk is addressed by focusing risk mitigation within individual models of a design
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versus distributing risk management broadly over the whole. System integration risk is
reduced by focusing on the riskiest modules and the use of margins or safety factors for
critical items such as fastener tolerances. In the second section (Chapter 12), the authors readdress technical risk and compare its relation to market risk. Too much technical risk
management, in the form of multiple reviews, can increase market risk by delaying a
project introducing uncertainty into sales predictions. Of course, not enough technical risk
management results in costly surprises late in the development cycle. Smith and Reinertsen
suggest that it depends on the project goals and a moderate level of risk management leads
to shorter development cycle times. To control risk, the authors offer a commonly used
chart where the probability of an event (i.e. assembly of the engineering prototypes) is
compared with the impact of it not happening (i.e. field tests slip 1 month) as shown in
Table 2. Events that are likely to occur with a high impact on schedule, say, are identified
as high risk.

Consequence
of Risk

Table 2: Risk Analysis Table
High Impact
Med Impact
Low Impact
Low

Med
High
Probability of Occurrence

In 2007, Michael Grieves wrote Product Lifecycle Development based on his
background in the automotive and IT industries. While not specifically focused on “rapid
development”, Grieves notes that cycle times are an external driver pushed by customers
and competition and provides examples of multiple industries that exhibit this phenomenon
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from the automobile to fashion to pharmaceuticals. His describes the five functional areas
of product lifecycles as “plan, design, build, support, dispose.” The planning consists of
“requirements analysis and planning” which leads into the design phase where engineers
play with trade-offs while ensuring the requirements are met. Prototypes are then built
based on specifications that ensure the “various components fit together in an integrated
system and that the system is internally consistent.” During the build phase, manufacturing
engineers decide how the product is built and in what steps. Finally the support and
disposal ensure feedback is attained from the customer and decisions are made concerning
what to do with it after its use.
Finally, the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA) has
published a collection of tools “most appropriate for use in the engineering design and
development phases” of new product development in The PDMA Toolbook 3 for New
Product Development. Released in 2007, PDMA Toolbook covers multiple topics from
trade-off analysis to intellectual property to development. Gregory Githens offers the
Rolling Wave approach to development cycles. In traditional projects, a schedule is built
and tasks are populated from beginning to end on the assumption that all actions required
are “knowable” upfront. The Rolling Wave approach seeks to create a “robust‟ schedule
that is flexible and overcomes “brittle schedules” that occur when early slips lead to
“individuals [that] narrow their focus to their own subjective view of priorities”.
The proposed solution seeks a “plan-do-plan-do” series of activities where
segments of the project are broken up into “rough order magnitudes” or “ROMs”. Tasks
are only planned out as the team reaches each ROM Group. The argument goes that task
completion dates grow in uncertainty the farther away they are. Therefore, focusing on

22

short-term forecasts will produce more reliable estimates in the long run. Githens
emphasizes that agility both in the product and project architecture. Product agility covers
interface management and the use of common technical standards. Project agility concerns
team composition, levels of authority, review and approval cycles, roles and
responsibilities, risk and issues analysis, escalation strategy, etc.” Githens then offers six
steps in executing a Rolling Wave approach as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Rolling Wave Methodology
Step 1 starts with a team charter that captures the requirements management, team
roles and responsibilities and lays out the vision of the project. Step 2 is creating a work
breakdown structure (WBS) to include Level 1 and Level 2 activities. Level 1 will be
segmented by the ROM Groups or “planning windows”. Tasks that are well understood
and can be detailed to the work package level are documented in the WBS while less
certain tasks, say specifications that require user feedback on prototypes, are left undefined
and assigned to later planning windows. Step 3 details the tasks of the WBS for each and
starts the “plan a little” stage. Cost and schedules are presented as range estimates that can
be as little as half the target or as much as twice the target. This requires project managers
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to gain the trust of stakeholders to allow the flexibility of this planning approach.
Additionally, a transition plan should be formulated to prevent delays at the end of
development and the beginning of product launch or delivery. Step 4 proposes managing
risk and reprioritizing activities versus establishing a baseline and monitoring variance.
Step 5 executes the first ROM Group or “do a little” with attention paid to monitoring risks
and keeping key stakeholders up to date if cost or schedule variances break a
predetermined threshold. Step 6 iterates the planning-doing cycles until completion. The
key activities are assessing the groups‟ progress, anticipating tasks in future planning
windows and ensuring the “big picture” is fixed in each team members‟ decision making
processes.
Summary
This chapter presented an overview of rapid development efforts within the DoD,
the USAF and AFRL. In addition it looked to industry for additional frameworks for rapid
development. These and other methods from literature will be compiled and consolidated in
Chapter 3. The common processes will be translated into the SE technical and technical
management processes to take advantage of acquisition training required for certification in
the acquisition career field. A purposive sampling of AFRL rapid development team
members will identify the methods currently used in the CP3 organization.
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III. METHODOLOGY

Introduction
A mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to assess the relative
importance of various processes and artifacts defined in Chapter 4, Systems Engineering,
of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) with respect to rapid development projects.
Terms referenced in the definitions of each process will be compared with those found in
the literature and evaluated based on importance. A management strategy will then be
proposed based on the relative importance of each process. A comparison with key
activities identified by a purposive sampling of AFRL rapid development team members
will provide an evaluation of the proposed strategy compared to recent projects.
With origins in the product development community, methodologies such as Stage
Gating, Product Lifecycle Management and Rapid Application Development offer
strategies to apply to rapid development. Identifying key processes in these methods will be
compared to the 8 technical and 8 technical management processes as defined in the DAG.
Product Development Literature Evaluation
Content analysis is a method that has origins in the 1940s and began with
conducting word counts on texts. Eventually it matured to concepts and meanings. A
conceptual analysis is a sub-category of content analysis where texts are examined for
frequency of words or phrases related to a research question. In this study, product
development texts will be examined for the frequency of SE keywords determined by this
author from the DAG SE process definitions. The relative frequency of these keywords will
provide insight as to what the authors deem important in instructing the reader how to do
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product development. A listing of keywords for the technical management and technical
processes can be found in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
Processes will be identified and assessed in each literature method based on their
importance. Importance in this case will be equated with frequency. The number of
references to keywords from the DAG SE process definitions will be normalized and
assigned an importance score ranging from 1- Not Important to 5- Extremely Important as
seen in Table 5. Keywords are listed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The reader is referred
to the DAG, Chapter 4, section 4.2.3, for complete definitions of each technical and
technical management process.
Table 3: Keywords of the Technical Management Processes
Technical Management Process
Decision Analysis
(DA)
Technical Planning
(TP)
Technical Assessment
(TA)
Requirements Management
(Req Mgmt)
Risk Management
Configuration Management
(Config Mgmt)
Data Management
Interface Management
(Int Mgmt)

Keywords
Trade Studies, Analyses- Alternatives, Supportability,
Cost, Trade Off
Scope of Technical Effort, Systems Engineering Plan
Technical Review, Program Review, Technical
Interchange, Interface Control Working Group
Requirements, Traceability, Change Management
Risk- Identification, Analysis, Mitigation, Tracking
Technical Baseline, Functional Baseline, Allocated
Baseline, Product Baseline, Change Management,
Audits
Technical Data, Records, Organization, Sharing
Interface Specifications, Standards, Compliance

26

Table 4: Keywords of the Technical Processes
Technical Process
Stakeholders Requirements
Definition (SRD)
Requirements Analysis
(RA)
Architecture Design
(AD)
Implementation (Imp)
Integration (Int)
Verification (Ver)
Validation (Val)
Transition (Trans)

Keywords
Requirements, CONOPS, Constraints, Stakeholder
Functional Analysis, Performance Requirements,
Functional Architecture
Design Solutions, Logical Models or Views, Physical
Architecture, Specification
System Elements, Production, Component Testing
Assembly, Interfaces, Incorporation, Prototype
Demonstration, Inspection, Analysis, Test
Validation, Evaluation
Installation, Integration, Fielding

Table 5: Importance Scale Descriptions
Importance Scale
0-1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5

Description
Not Important
Somewhat Important
Important
Very Important
Extremely Important

Proposed Framework
A comparison of each method against the 16 system engineering processes
endorsed by Chapter 4 of the DAG will highlight where emphasis has been given by the
authors. Keywords will be counted for frequency within the books and texts to indicate
importance and normalized to provide comparable values. Normalized scores are calculated
by the equation:
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Scorenormal 

Scorei
5 ,
MAX ( Scorei )

Where Scorei is the number of keyword references from each author for a process, i,
MAX(Scorei) is the maximum number of references from each author in a particular
process and multiplied by 5 to fit the scale in Table 5. This will normalize the scores to
show which is process is most emphasized which will be equated with most important. The
scores for the technical management and the technical processes will be normalized
separately since technical processes typically take place sequentially and technical
management processes occur throughout the life of a project. Scores will then be totaled
and calculated as a percentage to display relative weights to which program managers can
allocate resources (time, money, and people).
Purposive Sampling and Analysis
This study will follow a similar methodology conducted by a recent INCOSE paper
(Mulhearn and Brouse, 2011). In it, the authors investigate small information technology
(IT) projects with the intent of filtering the most important documents to “effectively and
efficiently manage the project”. Twelve knowledge areas were combined from ontologies
from both the program management and systems engineering literature to encompass the
technical emphasis of the IT projects. “Small” IT projects were defined as “under 12
months in duration and cost less than $1.5M.” A survey sent to a purposive sampling of IT
professionals identified the top 15% of documents and reviews. It is the intent of this
review to conduct the same evaluation with AFRL program managers for rapid reaction
projects.
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Interviews with key personnel (program managers and chief engineers) on rapid
development projects will provide an evaluation of the current emphasis placed on each
process. Each process will be assessed by the author on a 1-5 scale of importance. The
criteria are derived from SE technical process outputs as outlined in the INCOSE Systems
Engineering Handbook, v3.1. These definitions were chosen over standard DoD
Acquisition terminology to encompass activities that met the intent but weren‟t specifically
defined by DoD terms. Some criteria were augmented by DoD Developmental and
Operational Test activities where the INCOSE SE handbook provided insufficient
measures to stratify the formality of a particular process (i.e. Verification and Validation).
A listing of interview questions and topics is found in Appendix A. These scores will then
be compared with the model determined by the product development literature.

29

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

Overview
This chapter will present the results of the conceptual analysis of the product
development literature with respect to DAG SE processes. From this analysis, an allocation
of resources will be presented by looking at the relative scores of each process. The chapter
will then present the results of the levels of formality of SE processes uncovered in the case
studies. Finally, the two levels of importance will be compared with each other and
analyzed.
Results
Tables 11 and 12 show the normalized scores of the SE processes found in each
rapid development approach. Figures 6 and 7 display this data as bar charts, with the
standard deviation computed for the error bars. Based on the data, the most important
Technical Management processes for rapid development are Technical Planning, Decision
Analysis, Risk Management and Technical Assessment. There is a general concurrence that
Technical Planning is a must for product development as this process has the highest score
with one of the smallest deviations. All other Technical Management data show a mixed
emphasis for each of the other processes. Decision Analysis, Technical Assessment, Risk
Management are slightly more emphasized while Requirements Management,
Configuration Management and Data Management slightly less and Interface Management
almost not at all.
The most important Technical Processes are Stakeholder Requirements Definition,
Architecture Design and Integration. There is a concurrence that Stakeholder Requirements
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Definition is emphasized heavily while Architecture Design, Integration and Verification
are emphasized slightly more and Validation slightly less. Requirements Analysis,
Implementation and Transition received low scores having not been emphasized in the
texts.
Table 6: SE Technical Management Process Scores

Technical
Management
Processes

DA

TP

TA

Req
Mgt

Risk
Mgt

Config
Mgt

Data
Mgt

I/F
Mgt

Wheelright
and Clark
Cooper/ Stage
Gates
Smith and
Reinertsen
PLD
RAD
PDMA
AVERAGE
St Dev

2.50

5.00

1.50

0.50

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

4.17

5.00

3.33

0.00

3.33

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.14

5.00

1.43

1.43

5.00

1.43

1.43

0.71

1.25
1.67
4.38
2.68
1.30

3.75
5.00
4.38
4.69
0.52

0.00
1.67
5.00
2.15
1.75

1.25
3.33
0.63
1.19
1.17

0.00
1.67
3.13
2.35
1.81

3.75
3.33
0.63
1.52
1.65

5.00
3.33
0.63
1.73
2.03

0.00
0.00
0.63
0.22
0.35

Table 7: SE Technical Process Scores

Technical
Processes
Wheelright
and Clark
Cooper/ Stage
Gates
Smith and
Reinertsen
PLD
RAD
PDMA
Average
St Dev

SRD

RA

AD

Imp

Int

Ver

Val

5.00

1.67

3.33

1.67

2.92

2.50

2.50

Tran
s
0.00

5.00

0.56

1.67

0.56

1.11

2.22

1.67

1.11

2.22

1.11

5.00

0.00

1.67

0.56

0.00

0.56

3.75
5.00
5.00
4.33
1.15

1.25
1.67
0.34
1.10
0.55

3.75
1.67
0.86
2.71
1.57

0.00
0.00
0.17
0.40
0.66

5.00
1.67
0.34
2.12
1.64

2.50
3.33
0.34
1.91
1.19

1.25
1.67
0.34
1.24
0.93

0.00
0.83
0.52
0.50
0.44
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Figure 6: Technical Management Process Scores with Standard Deviation Error
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Figure 7: Technical Process Scores with Standard Deviation Error
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Analysis
From the emphasis the literature places on the technical management processes, the
project manager must first manage the scope and develop the technical plan for achieving
the project objectives. This is a logical conclusion since vague requirements or a lack of
technical direction can lead to miscommunication or mismanaged expectations which can
lead to rework or product rejection. This does not mean that the initial scope or technical
plan must change, rather that the project manager must manage how potential changes
affect the development of the end product. Once the technical planning process is in place,
the project manager must support it with Decision Analysis, Technical Assessments and
Risk Management. In other words, to direct the technical effort a project manager must
understand the performance and cost trade-offs of different approaches, assess the progress
throughout the development and have a robust risk management procedure- identify,
assess, mitigate, track- to deal with problems before they come to bear. Requirements
Management, Configuration Management, Data Management and Interface Management
are all things a project manager should be mindful of, however, they should not take a
majority of his/her time and resources.
The Technical Management scores generally follow the “Design- Build- Test
Cycle” put forward by Wheelright and Clark. Stakeholder Requirements Definition was
clearly the most important which is logical since new products are developed to meet a
need, whether a perceived need in the commercial industry or a stated need in the defense
acquisition system. A project manager must understand how the new product is intended to
perform, in what environment, how it interacts with other systems and so on. Architecture
Design followed next with a physical solution to meet the requirements. Having CAD
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models and logical views, such as the DoDAF Architecture, ensures that the team is “on the
same page” for designing the system. Integration and Verification were next in importance
showing that it is important to put the components together correctly and test the system to
ensure it was built right.
The lower Technical Management process scores could be explained as an outcome
of focusing on the higher scored processes. For example, if a project clearly defines the
outputs of the Stakeholder Requirements Definition process- namely the CONOPS,
environment, constraints as stated by all the stakeholders- the Validation testing should be
easier and thus less emphasized. If the Architecture Design is correct, then the
Implementation of building the components to the design specifications should be well
understood and less emphasized. If the right product is built correctly, then Transition
should follow without major problems. The score for Requirements Analysis however
seems out of place. This result could be explained by its dependence on a successful
Stakeholder Requirements Definition phase, but it is also conceivable that the keywords
chosen were an inaccurate measure of the process or that the keywords exist primarily
within the systems engineering community or specific to DoD SE that the authors of the
texts under study did not use this terminology.
By converting the scores to an overall percentage, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, a
program manager can weigh each process relative to the other and plan out a project. Since
these are process resource allocations it makes more sense to apply these percentages to the
management of a project and not the overall budget, which could include high-cost items. It
can be helpful to think of applying the percentages to the time allotted during regular
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meetings or hours in a week that a project manager focuses his/her time directing the
project.

Figure 8: Technical Management Process Resource Allocation

Figure 9: Technical Process Resource Allocation
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One concept not captured in evaluating the different processes was iteration. Most
of the texts cited process iteration as a key strategy in product development. Once a design
is created, it is presented to the stakeholders for feedback and refinement. This could
happen multiple times but the Rapid Application Development team suggests at least three
iterations. The inability of this evaluation to capture the importance of design iteration
could give program managers a false impression that a single pass development strategy
using the above resource allocations will produce a successful product. A more successful
strategy is to integrate the user into the development team providing constant feedback as
the product grows from requirements to specifications to assembly and test.
Key Activities Identified by AFRL Rapid Reaction Team Members
A purposive sampling was conducted between AFRL Scientist and Engineer (S&E)
employees that have participated in Core Process 3 (CP3) projects. Individual interviews
sought to establish a baseline of common practices for project managers. The interviews
were conducted among engineers and program managers with 2-6 years of experience in
AFRL rapid development with projects ranging from 6 months to 3 years in schedule and
$500,000 to $12M in budget. Backgrounds ranged from prior military service to active duty
to career civilian with positions in and outside of AFRL. Team sizes for their rapid
development projects ranged from 3 to 12 people.
For each technical and technical management process, a common set of products
(i.e. work breakdown structure, integrated master plan, team charter, key resources for
Technical Planning) was evaluated for whether the subject fully, partially or did not
accomplish during their projects. (A full list of the common products can be found in
Appendix A.) The author infers from this assessment that the effort put to creating (or not
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creating) these products reflects a level of importance the subject placed on each technical
and technical management process. These scores will be compared with the literature
review scores and analyzed in Chapter 5.
Figures 10 and 11 show the results from the interviews. The scores are on the same
scale of level of importance (1 to 5) and reflect what project managers have done. The
technical process scores at first glance do not present any “smoking guns”. Architecture
Design and Implementation show slightly higher scores while Verification, Validation and
Transition show slightly lower. Since rapid development projects are by nature short on
schedule, little slack is built in and thus an emphasis on doing more up front is displayed in
the data. Subjects noted using engineering standards and monitoring progress to identify
opportunities as ways to stay within short timelines.
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Figure 10: AFRL Rapid Development Technical Process Scores
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Figure 11: AFRL Rapid Development Technical Management Scores

The technical management processes, however, show greater variability. Decision
Analysis, Technical Planning, Technical Assessments and Data Management all have
higher scores than Requirements, Risk, Configuration and Interface Management. During
interviews, it was commented that rapid development projects require strong leadership,
delegation to the most competent team members, and emphasizing sharing information
over documentation as successful strategies during rapid development projects. These
themes reflect the first three processes listed. The last process, Data Management, may
have scored higher due to the complex technical nature of the projects.
Many interviewees had comments that could not be captured by the survey on how
they do rapid development. The following statements were from individuals and not
themes expressed by multiple people. One interviewee likened rapid development to a
“jazz [band], not an orchestra.” Another noted that he would have more “Interim Program
Reviews” with newer teams to build up the trust in the group and cut back once the team
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was performing at a sufficient level. His advice on time management was to “identify the
most critical risks” to the project weekly and mitigate during hour-long conference calls
and that rapid development “required strong leadership.” The smaller risks were often left
to individual team members, allowing the more senior team members to focus on the hard
problems. Another interviewee said he didn‟t receive enough training on risk management
when applied to rapid development. One suggested that you don‟t use Microsoft Project
and that schedules don‟t show activities finer than one week.
One interviewee felt the current project milestones weren‟t chosen without
monitoring a project, but rather were held based on the initial schedule. He felt that reviews
were being held to catch problems and that issues “should be caught before test reviews”.
When applied to software, he felt that rapid development didn‟t afford time to check bugs
in code written by geographically separated programmers, that there “wasn‟t time for QA
[quality control].
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V. DISCUSSION

Overview
This study set out to identify key processes within the Department of Defense
Systems Engineering framework that were of importance to rapid development projects
within AFRL. A content analysis of product development literature, where industry strives
to be the first to market a quality product, was performed across six different sources
representing various communities in product development- academia, consultancy,
software, trade association- and across 15 years of research. The frequency of keywords
derived from the DAG definitions of each project was used to infer an importance
emphasized by each of the texts. By computing a relative score on a scale of 1 to 5, certain
processes were shown to be more important in product development. Technical Planning
stood out as the most important Technical Management process followed by Decision
Analysis, Technical Assessment and Risk Management. Stakeholders Requirements
definition showed to be the most important Technical Process with Architecture Design,
Integration and Verification
A purposive sampling of AFRL S&E employees was conducted to evaluate the
current implementation of SE processes within rapid development projects. Interviewees
were asked to describe their approach to projects they had participated in or led. The author
evaluated their responses with a numerical score based on how fully different SE products
were created and thus their importance inferred. While the technical processes showed
relatively similar results, Architecture Design and Implementation were scored slightly
higher. This has been attributed to the short schedules of rapid development forcing more
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emphasis “up front”. Technical management processes that scored higher included
Decision Analysis, Technical Planning and Assessment, and Data Management. The theme
here is that a strong decision making framework (or strong leadership) is useful to keep
skilled teams on schedule during technically complex projects.
When combined, the content analysis and purposive sampling offer an interesting
comparison. Figures 12 and 13 show both sets of scores for the SE processes. First, we‟ll
examine the technical process scores. While both sets of data agree that Architecture
Design is important, the literature does not emphasize Requirements Analysis (RA) nor
Implementation to the same degree that the AFRL S&E‟s place importance on those
processes. The literature does, however, place a large emphasis on Stakeholders
Requirements‟ Definition.
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Figure 12: Combined Technical Process Scores
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Trans

Since RA is derived from the initial requirements, it may be that the literature
leaves it to the reader to perform the engineering activities to go from requirements to
design and does not devote as much time to explaining that effort. However, for AFRL
S&E‟s it is an important piece of the design process to ensure stakeholders‟ concerns are
matched to performance specifications. Implementation consists of designing and testing
the subsystems and components. This being an internal process that feeds into the final,
assembled product, the literature may place little emphasis compared to other processes.
AFRL S&E‟s noted that constructing a prototype to show a user early and quickly was a
key step that allowed feedback to modify design or requirements.
The literature also shows little emphasis on transition compared to AFRL S&E‟s.
This could be an assumption in the literature that if you research, design, build and test
successfully consumers will buy your product. In the Lab, product transition is less of a
guarantee and subject to separate acquisition organizations that require advocacy and
funding above that required for the rapid development project. The remainder process
scores are comparable to each other.
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Figure 13: Combined Technical Management Process Scores
Next, we will examine the technical management process scores. The main
discrepancies are in Technical Planning and Interface Management. The literature places
the most emphasis in determining the scope of the technical effort and developing a
systems engineering plan to cover all aspects of a project. However, many of the
interviewees attested that iterating on a design with feedback from the user was more
important than developing a “fire-proof” plan. Interface Management was emphasized
more among AFRL S&E‟s than in the literature. This could be due to the integrated nature
of defense products especially with sensor technologies that are designed to push
information and intelligence products across an enterprise of users. The literature is either
not concerned primarily with products integrated with external interfaces such as designing
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a portable CD player or assumes that the external interfaces exist and are well defined like
the USB ports on your personal computer and thus assigns it relatively little importance.
To summarize the technical process scores, the literature and AFRL S&Es agreed
to the general principle of “up-front and early” when conducting rapid development. The
literature emphasized Stakeholders Requirements Development and Architecture Design.
The S&Es were more uniform in their results and agreed on the importance of Architecture
Design but also emphasized Implementation. The technical management processes were
also generally similar, but the literature showed Technical Planning was of stronger
importance and Interface Management of lesser importance when compared to the AFRL
S&E scores.
A possible explanation for differences in both analyses is the “practitioner vs.
pundit” effect. With respect to the “pundits”, the content analysis of the literature has
shown a strong preference for one process over another, in this case Tech Planning vs
Interface Management. The authors may be assuming a level of understanding within their
intended audience that masks the relative importance of each process. They could also
overemphasize processes that either were ignored in the past or were executed poorly.
From the point of view of the “practitioner” there may be a stronger emphasis on the
processes that are requirements due to policy or practicality. Most of the technical process
scores cluster around 2.75, with a score of 3 meaning the process was “important” vice
“very important” or “not important” and the activities within the process were neither fully
implemented nor fully ignored. In this study, the literature deems Implementation as “not
important”. This contrasts with the AFRL engineers which score it as “important”. In
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reality, a project must implement the design, otherwise there would be no product to test or
deliver.
Conclusions
This study set out to determine if there were key Systems Engineering Processes
emphasized by product development literature that could be implemented within AFRL
rapid development projects. From the literature, Stakeholders Requirements Definition,
Architecture Design and Technical Planning were strongly emphasized when compared to
the other processes. This agrees with the anecdotal lesson learned “plan up front and early”.
While interviewees agreed that up-front technical planning was important to maintaining
short schedules, progress in delivering a prototype iterating the design based on user
feedback was as important. Based on these results, project managers and chief engineers
participating in future AFRL CP3 and other rapid development projects should focus on
these processes early on in the projects‟ lifecycle. Senior leaders should encourage training
in developing project requirements, architectures and holding meaningful reviews.
Recommendations and Areas of Future Research
The framework developed in this study could serve as a guide for program
managers of rapid development projects. AFRL‟s Core Process 3 teams could be made
aware of the findings codified by modifying the current AFRL instruction for CP3 or as an
accompanying AFRL Manual.
The outcome of the importance of the SE processes was highly dependent on the
materials chosen. The methodology can be implemented further by including more product
development literature or by focusing on a particular field (i.e. software development) and
comparing to case studies within that field.
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This research was conducted to follow up previous studies of rapid development
within AFRL and the AFIT theses of Capt David Solomon and Majors Behm, Pitzer and
White should also be consulted for additional topics.
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APPENDIX A: SE PRODUCTS SURVEY
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APPENDIX B: LITERATURE SCORES
Raw Scores (frequency count)

Wheelright and Clark
Cooper/ Stage Gates
Smith and Reinertsen
PLM
RAD- Total
RAD- Standard, 1995
RAD- Implemented, 2000

PDMA
Handbook 2, 2005
Toolbook 3, 2007

Wheelright and Clark
Cooper/ Stage Gates
Smith and Reinertsen
PLM
RAD- Total
RAD- Standard, 1995
RAD- Implemented, 2000

PDMA
Handbook 2, 2005
Toolbook 3, 2007

Stakeholders
Requirements
Definition
12
9
4
3
6
3
3
12
11
1

Decision Analysis
5
5
3
1
1
1
0
7
6
1

Requirements
Analysis
Arch Design Implementation Integration Verification
4
8
4
7
6
1
3
1
2
4
2
9
0
3
1
1
3
0
4
2
2
2
0
2
4
1
1
0
1
3
1
1
0
1
1
2
5
1
2
2
1
4
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Technical
Planning
10
6
7
3
3
2
1
7
6
1

Technical Requirements
Assessment Management
3
1
4
0
2
2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1
2
8
1
7
0
1
1

Validation
6
3
0
1
2
1
1
2
1
1

Transition
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
3
2
1

Risk Mgmt Config Mgmt Tech Data Mgmt Interface Mgmt
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
7
2
2
1
0
3
4
0
1
2
2
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
5
1
1
1
4
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

Normalized Scores
Technical Processes
Wheelright and Clark
Cooper/ Stage Gates
Smith and Reinertsen
PLM
RAD
PDMA
Average
St Dev
Percent of Total
Percent St Dev

SRD
5.00
5.00
2.22
3.75
5.00
5.00
4.33
1.15
30.3%
22.93%

RA
1.67
0.56
1.11
1.25
1.67
0.34
1.10
0.55
7.7%
11.07%

AD
3.33
1.67
5.00
3.75
1.67
0.86
2.71
1.57
19.0%
31.38%

Imp
1.67
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.40
0.66
2.8%
13.15%

Technical
Management
Processes
Wheelright and Clark
Cooper/ Stage Gates
Smith and Reinertsen
PLM
RAD
PDMA
AVERAGE
St Dev
Percent of Total
Percent St Dev

DA
2.50
4.17
2.14
1.25
1.67
4.38
2.68
1.30
16.2%
26.04%

TP
5.00
5.00
5.00
3.75
5.00
4.38
4.69
0.52
28.3%
10.46%

TA
1.50
3.33
1.43
0.00
1.67
5.00
2.15
1.75
13.0%
35.01%

Req Mgmt
0.50
0.00
1.43
1.25
3.33
0.63
1.19
1.17
7.2%
23.44%
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Int
2.92
1.11
1.67
5.00
1.67
0.34
2.12
1.64
14.8%
32.87%

Ver
2.50
2.22
0.56
2.50
3.33
0.34
1.91
1.19
13.3%
23.84%

Risk Mgmt Config Mgmt
1.00
0.00
3.33
0.00
5.00
1.43
0.00
3.75
1.67
3.33
3.13
0.63
2.35
1.52
1.81
1.65
14.2%
9.2%
36.22%
33.10%

Val
2.50
1.67
0.00
1.25
1.67
0.34
1.24
0.93
8.7%
18.53%

Trans
0.00
1.11
0.56
0.00
0.83
0.52
0.50
0.44
3.5%
8.89%

Data Mgmt
0.00
0.00
1.43
5.00
3.33
0.63
1.73
2.03
10.5%
40.56%

Int Mgmt
0.00
0.00
0.71
0.00
0.00
0.63
0.22
0.35
1.3%
6.94%

Totals
47
25
20
14
19
11
8
29
21
8

21
19
26
12
12
6
6
31
23
8

APPENDIX C: SME SCORES

Background Data
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Yrs RD Exp
6
5
2
2
3
2
3

Min Sched Max Sched Min Budget Max Budget
Min
Max
(years)
(years)
($'000)
($'000)
Team Size Team Size
0.5
3
500
3000
1
10
0.5
2
500
1000
3
12
2
2
70000
70000
90
90
0.5
1.5
500
2000
6
12
1
1.5
600
1000
3
6
1
2
20000
100000
20
50
0.5
2
500
2000
5
12

Technical Process Scores
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

SRD
3.40
4.00
3.00
1.50
3.00
5.00
1.67

RA
3.50
4.00
3.00
2.33
3.00
5.00
1.50

AD
2.50
4.33
2.00
3.67
5.00
4.00
4.00

Imp
3.00
4.75
3.00
3.00
3.00
5.00
3.67

Int
3.50
2.00
2.50
3.50
2.00
4.50
3.67

Ver
1.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
5.00
3.67

Val
1.00
1.67
5.00
3.00
2.33
4.00
2.00

Trans
2.33
1.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.20
1.00

Technical Management Scores
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

DA
3.25
3.00
2.60
4.00
3.50
3.00
1.80

TP
2.00
4.40
2.60
3.40
2.50
4.33
1.00

TA
1.00
2.33
2.20
3.00
2.67
5.00
2.60

Req
Risk Config Data
Int
Mgmt Mgmt Mgmt Mgmt Mgmt
1.50
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.67
2.00
1.00
4.00
3.00
2.33
2.50
2.20
4.00
2.00
1.67
1.00
1.50
1.00
1.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.33
5.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
2.20
3.00
5.00
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